

West Papua, defusing the minefield. A 'failing Papuan State'?

BY BONNY KAIYO

Introduction

West Papua is a colony settled by two alien administrations, namely the Dutch for 300 years and later Indonesia for 60 years. It is by definition a UN Trust Territory that shows all the signs to follow Timor-Leste and South Sudan into statehood at the right time, but its success as a new Melanesian state is shadowed by the so-called 'failing state', tag like its closest neighbours Papua New Guinea (PNG), Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands. It is possible West Papua would face similar difficulties affecting its neighbouring tribal Melanesian countries post-independence, and there are challenges an independent West Papua could likely face. Despite the cannibalized decolonization process, if given freedom there are also prospects for a better future for ordinary Papuans, whether through independence or genuine autonomy within Indonesia.

Background

History repeats itself as truth and falsehood converge, and in an endless process, the dialectics of the different historical epochs have a tendency to probe suspect conclusions and insinuate preferences to bring back merit to a vile human civilization. Indeed, historical account of the failure by the international community or society, and especially the US, to come good on the doctrine of responsibility to protect the world and the colonized subjects in the non ó European world, is contentious. It points to blanks which exist in the writing of possible histories for Non ó Self Governing Territories including West New Guinea or West Papua in the endeavour towards a comparison of conferment of statehood on colonial peoples who fought for their emancipation. Chris Ballard(1999), in 'Blanks in the writing: possible histories for West New Guinea', *Journal of Pacific History*, notes that where it cuts across the island of New Guinea, the 141st meridian east remains one of colonial cartography's more arbitrary yet effective of boundaries. If a statement has been issued on this occasion, then the question would be simple for the Papuan: öWho bit my border?ö David Adam Stott(2011), in the hyperlink, *Japan Focus*, contextualised Machiavellian Statecraft, a subject of inquiry which drove decolonization, and is of fundamental interest towards a study of the conceptions which have determined the outlook of both European powers, and later neo - colonial administrations, and their relationship with the indigenous people of Melanesia whom they exercised political control in the era of decolonization from 1919 till present, 2013.

On July 9, 2011 another irrational colonial border that demarcated Sudan was consigned to history when South Sudan achieved independence. In the process an often seemingly irrevocable principle of decolonisation, that boundaries inherited from colonial entities should remain sacrosanct, has been challenged once again. Indeed, a cautious trend in international relations has been to support greater self-determination for 'nations' without awarding full statehood. Yet Kosovo is another state whose recent independence has been recognised by most major players in the international community. In West Papua's case, the territory's small but growing elite had been preparing for independence from the Netherlands in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and Dutch plans envisaged full independence by 1970.

However, in 1962 Cold War realpolitik intervened and the United States engineered a transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia under the auspices of the United Nations. To Indonesian nationalists their revolution became complete since West New Guinea had previously been part of the larger colonial unit of the Netherlands East Indies, which had realised its independence as Indonesia in 1949. In West New Guinea, most Papuans felt betrayed by the international community and have been campaigning for a proper referendum on independence ever since.

Jakarta has staunchly resisted any discussion of West Papua's status outside of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. However, in February 1999 Papuan civil society representatives convened in Jakarta for unprecedented talks with President Habibie, Suharto's successor who was eager to demonstrate his reformist credentials. Habibie's own successor Abdurrahman Wahid initially attempted a policy of tentative engagement with Papuan civil society, which included sponsoring the Papuan Congress of May 2000. This so-called 'Papuan Spring' of 1999-2000 marked the zenith of pan-Papuan organising and solidarity, prompting speculation that West Papua might follow East Timor in conducting a referendum over its status. During this period Papuan nationalists were also able to fly their Morning Star flag for the first time without fear of long jail terms or violent reprisals. However, Marcus Mietzner(2009), who wrote on *Military Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia*, said as hardliners in the Indonesian military consolidated power after a period of relative , weakness, the flowers of the Papuan Spring withered and Wahid was removed from office in July 2001.

In response to the Papuan Spring, the Indonesian authorities have pursued a dual strategy ó a repressive security approach that also characterised the Suharto years (1966-1998) and co-option of local elites through the 2001 Special Autonomy Law, which has been used to promote greater Papuan participation in local administration. The security approach has combined increasing troop numbers with greater surveillance of civil society, and since mid-2000 the state has again responded to flag-raising ceremonies with violence and long prison terms. In a symbolic act, the Indonesian military's special forces also killed Papuan Congress chairman Theys Eluay in November 2001. Meanwhile, the Special Autonomy Law, on paper a much more comprehensive devolution of authority than most other provinces gained under Indonesia's nationwide regional autonomy legislation of 1999, was designed to assuage Papuan demands for independence. However, Richard Chauvel(2011), calls into question the legal ó rational ideological basis of legitimacy that was to confer authority on the Indonesian government authorities and the military. He writes in the *Inside Story*, that whilst the territory does receive the biggest per capita allocation of central government development funds in Indonesia, Jakarta does not trust indigenous Papuan officials enough to properly implement Special Autonomy and has therefore severely curtailed much of the promised autonomy. Its halting implementation has also been accompanied by increasing numbers of Indonesian migrants settling in West Papua.

So far, this dual strategy of dividing Papuan civil society and increasing the costs of Papuan resistance has appeared effective since the momentum generated during the Papuan Spring has not been sustained. Nevertheless, the frequent demonstrations across the territory protesting the failures of Special Autonomy and demanding a referendum have taken on a greater urgency since Indonesian migrants now constitute more than half of West Papua's population. However, if allowed to vote in a referendum it is probable that many of these settlers would view continuing integration with Indonesia as more in their interest. This raises the question of whether they could or should be excluded from participating in any vote on

West Papua's status. At the time of East Timor's referendum in 1999, Indonesian migrants constituted around 10% of its population and were excluded from the voter registration process. For Papuan nationalists, the demographic situation is therefore much more perilous, and as John Roskam (2006, April 21) gauged in the *Australian Financial Review*, an independent West Papua is unviable. This paper will attempt to analyse what kind of independent state West Papua might become if the territory were to follow Timor-Leste and South Sudan into statehood. Would it become another so-called 'failing state', like its closest neighbours Papua New Guinea (PNG), Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands? By examining some of the difficulties affecting West Papua's neighbours post-independence this paper will introduce some of the main challenges an independent West Papua could likely face. In conclusion it will examine the prospects for a better future for ordinary Papuans, whether through independence or genuine autonomy within Indonesia.

A discussion, which espouses critical theory or critical sociology, is necessary. This form of social analysis equates the failure of the international community to play a positive role of detecting and unmasking the existing forms of belief in order to enhance the emancipation of men in society with the inability to protect West Papua as a colonial possession, in 1969, and today, in 2013. This writer holds that useful lessons may be applied from the US decolonization of the Philippines, and the exercise in state formation by Japan during the Second World War which culminated in a proclamation of the Indonesian Republic on 17 August 1945, a few days before the Japanese capitulation. The lessons mirror and entail the proposition pursued by the international community in validating, and weighing out the task, if any, to free all colonized peoples from suppression and oppression as West Papua comes on the radar of the responsibility to protect doctrine.

The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine

K R Popper (1980), in the book, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, espouses critical theory or critical sociology, and equates this form of social analysis with the failure of international community led by US to protect West Papua. Critical sociology was a form of social analysis which came to mean uncovering hidden assumptions and debunking any such claim to authority. It was also about simple fault finding and an appropriate social analysis which drives the criticism of society, and in the case of West Papua, factors in on both mounting criticism by the international community of Indonesian control and illegal annexation of West Papua besides playing a positive role of detecting and unmasking the existing forms of belief in order to enhance the emancipation of men in society. Furthermore, this Hegelian doctrine sees, and equates the West Papua struggle for protection as a sequence in human history and a progression of human self awareness which constantly transformed and went beyond social constraints. Popper traces the absence of institutional system of political domination to deficit in political representation and consent, the fact that war fought covertly and overtly with the legitimate use of violence by the US and the Chinese Machiavelli which collided to determine the fate of the West Papuan state. The Papua Conflict is about emancipation of men in society that has been delayed, prevented, disguised, or avoided, as part and parcel of the concept of war itself. In the process, as Jim Lobe wrote for the Asia Times (July 13, 2004), in *US sacrificed Papua to court Suharto*, the US failed to create an institutional system of political domination and consolidate political representation and consent, West Papuan freedom fighters sought, and have successfully established the Papuan state despite US fraud to dock and diffuse the democratic process. On the 35th anniversary of the so-called Act of Free Choice" (AFC), Lobe shows how the US fraud during the AFC had resulted in West Papua's

annexation by Indonesia, about the time newly declassified documents which revealed that the administration of the late US president Richard Nixon was unwilling to raise any objections to the process despite its assessment that the move was overwhelmingly opposed by the Papuan people.

According to Popper, authoritarian intimidation is linked to military scientists who contemplate war as the highest intensification of all spiritual energies of an age, the utmost effort of the people's spiritual power. Indeed, war provides the basis on which the human soul may manifest itself at the fullest height. During the years of so-called peace, politics has meaning in as much as it will lead to preparation for total war. The famous existential philosopher, Max Scheler, in 1915, said war means the state in its actual growth and rise, it means politics. Another existential philosopher, Freyer, in 1935, said the state from the first moment of its existence, takes a stand in the sphere of war. Thus, war is not only the most perfect form of state activity; it is the very element in which the state is embedded. In other words, war delayed, prevented, disguised, or avoided, is part and parcel of the concept of state-formation. And, it follows that West Papua is at war because a state has been already formed and proclaimed under international law. Indeed, it was critical sociology or the Hegelian Doctrine which buttressed US decolonization of the Philippines and the exercise in state-formation by Japan during the Second World War leading to the proclamation of the Indonesian Republic on 17 August 1945, a few days before the Japanese capitulation. Moreover, as the struggle gains momentum, West Papua's war of independence is increasingly driven and blends with critical sociology or the Hegelian Doctrine today, as was the case from the beginning of the Papua Conflict, in 1969.

The Hegelian doctrine means that the fate of West Papua and the Papuan fight for freedom is just. It underlines the emancipation by West Papua, and enhances the emancipation of men in society. It also supports the position that Indonesia's inclusion of West Papua as part of the Republic is illegal and breaches the Round Table Conference held in The Hague on 2 November, 1949. Despite its ability and past record to cajole, persuade, and even frighten as many as possible in the international community or society to follow its democratic political leadership into a consensus, under pressure from the UN, Indonesia stands to capitulate. And, without the US, a democratising Indonesia will be unilaterally forced to transfer power to West Papua. The colony, like the Philippines in 1946, is qualified to be free. Yet, Jakarta has staunchly resisted any discussion of West Papua's status outside of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. West Papua and the inquiry into the UN dependency-status project, therefore, may be seen in the context of the responsibility of the international community or society to protect tribal Melanesians and Pacific Islanders who are in a position to demand independence from Indonesia, and not integration or assimilation into the Indonesian Republic.

US decolonisation of the Philippines

Like the Philippines, it is a simple story, and useful lessons may be applied from the US decolonization of the Philippines, in terms of validating, and weighing out the proposition pursued by the greatest country on earth to be free and in turn free all colonized peoples from suppression and oppression. It is about establishing if that proposition is still valid today, as it was, when the US itself fought a war of liberation against England and won. Independence, therefore, was won from England.

As a former colony that won its independence in a lengthy struggle against a European colonial power, the US had always distrusted the colonial expansion of Europe and took responsibility to protect people fighting for statehood, and an end to the colonial mentality. The strong resistance to annexation, particularly in the Senate, is well ó known, and this position has remained as to having a sense of civilising mission since Rudyard Kipling wrote his famous poem, "White Man's Burden" in 1899. The aim of the Republican administration between 1900 and 1912 on the question of self ó government for the Philippines, was to the extent that it was within the ambit of US national policy to govern the Philippine Islands for the benefit and welfare and uplifting of the people of the islands and gradually to extend to them, as soon as they were able to show themselves fit to exercise it, a greater measure of popular self ó government. In other words, when the Filipino people as a whole show themselves reasonably fit to conduct a popular self ó government, maintaining law and order, and offering equal protection of the laws and civil rights to rich and poor, and desire complete independence of the US, they would be given this measure of self ó governance.

Adolf Von Albertini(1982), in the book, *Decolonization: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919 – 1960*, wrote an account of the US national policy on the self ó determination of the Philippine. He explained that the US national policy was clear, and demonstrated the extent to which the US had felt obliged very early on to accept the principle of independence for the Philippines, and to justify its domination due to the circumstances that prevailed and nothing more. Indeed, the US had proceeded to politicize its colony early, so that it differed considerably from the British, French, and Dutch colonies in South East Asia. This was despite the laissez ó faire nature of the Jones Act, the forerunner to the Independence Act, which set the momentum to bring about decisive reforms together with the darker aspects: dissension and corruption in the administration, a deficit in the budget, the threat of a collapse of the national bank, the railway, and state industries. It was considered that these misgivings were normal and merely transitional features of the transfer of government responsibility to the Filipinos. The US government representative in the Philippines, Governor Harrison, referred to these obstacles and said self ógovernment was necessarily bound up with a certain amount of inefficiency. In reply to a Philippines mission which had demanded the recognition of national self ó determination, President Woodrow Wilson put the issue beyond doubt. President Wilson declared before Congress in December 1920 that the Philippines had reached the desirable "stable government" and that it was now the duty of the US to hold onto its earlier promises to grant independence to its colonial possession in South East Asia.

A Democrat, President Woodrow Wilson had complied with the anti ó colonialism position of the party as well as the conclusions reached during the Treaty of Versailles where he was clearly committed to nation ó building projects in the non ó European world, even though there were few parallels in contemporary European colonial policy at the time. The Republican administration led by President Harding and Vice President Coolidge, which took over from the Democrats, also concluded that the national movement was authentic and involved more than a minority, and the solution that surfaced was the proposition for an autonomy statute with a later plebiscite on independence. This willingness to reform went beyond what evolved in the European context or sphere and prepared the ground for the discussions in the period 1930-34, and thus the 1934 Independence Act. The 1934 Act gave the Philippines independence, after a transitional period of ten years. On 4 July 1946, President Truman proclaimed the independence of the Philippines thereby keeping the

promise of 1934 which on several occasions had been confirmed during the Second World War.

Indeed, the blanks are obvious. The history of the struggle for emancipation for West New Guinea or West Papua can be filled by drawing useful lessons from the Philippines case, and a comparison made as to whether or not there is any sense and therefore ascertain, get behind the story, and bolster the demands for conferment of statehood on a colonial and tribal peoples of Melanesia and the Pacific who are fighting for their emancipation. The blanks in the writing of possible histories for Non ó Self Governing Territories in the region including West New Guinea, or West Papua, demands to be re- visited for want of international best practice. Dennis & Ching Ping Bloodworth(1976), in the book, *The Chinese Machiavelli: 30,000 Years of Chinese Statecraft*, suggest that besides international best practice, which was denied, West Papua may also be a casualty of political ó military lore which underpinned the Chinese and US policies in peace and in war. West Papua was a victim of the gentle art of war. The present discussion is however limited and the topic will be taken on the face of it, the fact that the US inspired, orchestrated, and sealed the fate of a colonized people or colonial possession instead of causing decolonization, and therefore independence to be won. It was the US which championed peace, development, and human rights, as it should for the correct reasons and to avoid the agony of tugging at the heartstrings of colonized peoples in damage ó control mode. Ideally, state formation in West Papua stands to be concluded by the UN, along with the US, in the continuing irate scramble by humanity for peace, development, and human rights. And, with the warning signals of the Chinese Machiavelli and China's global super soft power approach sounding.

Here is the saga of compelling counter ó punch, contradiction, and problem with the US's role in internationalism. On 4 July 1946, President Truman proclaimed the independence of the Philippines thereby keeping the promise of 1934, however, not until 1955 were economic relations and military agreements settled on a more or less bilateral basis, and the US pussy ó footing and sceptical on the question of self ó determination demanded by Filipinos. Eventually, the US was compelled to account for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, the US had to befriend anti-communist governments which were emerging from the status of colonial subjects owing to the developments in the international arena following the Bandung Conference and hence the coming into being of Non ó Aligned Movement. Secondly, the US had to befriend anti-communist governments which were emerging from the status of colonial subjects in the face of the rise of China as a world super power, in other words, in order to counter the Chinese challenge. It could be argued that although the US followed the path to rid itself of its colonial possession in South East Asia, it was half of the story. The political calculations to serve its national interests overwhelmed any concern for the colonial subjects, and it could be encapsulated from this portrayal that the US had brought decolonization to an end only after 1955, several years after the British, Dutch, and French withdrawal from the vast area of South East Asia. Hence, it was providential that the Philippines, after independence, shifted into gear to define a pathway for its people thus moving away from its colonial past embedded in a historical period in which Europe arrogantly proclaimed its superiority of race and civilization, and saw itself destined to dominate foreign peoples permanently and justified the pattern of dominance ideologically as the 'Whiteman's Burden'

Albertini(1982), again expressed, and makes a point about US expansionism. He elucidated that US expansionism could be distinguished by its integrationist and assimilative character,

as is to be glimpsed in the conferment of statehood on Alaska and Hawaii in 1959 and 1960. According to this theory of decolonization, one cannot define US expansionism as colonial expansion, because there is absence of real colonial mentality ever evolving as happened with the British, Dutch, and French up until the withdrawal of the colonial administrations from the vast area of South East Asia. Likewise, Indonesia gives the impression that the international community and society, especially the UN and the US, cannot define its expansionism in West Papua for the past 60 years as colonial expansion, because there is absence of real colonial mentality ever evolving as happened with the British, Dutch, and French up until the withdrawal of the colonial administrations from the vast area of South East Asia. This explains to some extent why Indonesia has also taken too long to decolonize West Papua, and like the US in the Philippines, Indonesia views its expansionist tendencies normal. It is ordinary, therefore, to see Indonesia treating any demands for independence by West Papuan nationalists as a question to be answered except contemplated within the borders of integrationist and assimilation policies of the mother country by means of extended civil rights and parliamentary representation. However, such a theory of state does not weigh up and suffers from a legitimacy deficit and fails to address and allay the smouldering hurt of the comprehension that West Papua deserves better from the political fabric of internationalism, and grievously hurt by the US itself for 60 long years since 1969. In other words, the proposition by the Hegelian doctrine which derives the state from the first moment of its existence as an entity that takes a stand in the sphere of war, which is not only the most perfect form of state activity but the very element in which the state is embedded has a moral for West Papua. This would clearly embody, validate, and sum up the civilian resistance and national defence of the Papuan nation state as a legitimate partnership that is sought by the culture of humanity to conclude a proper UN-sanctioned self-determination exercise in West Papua.

The exercise in state – Formation by Japan

In order to set in train the debate on decolonization of the non-European world, the US stands to account on the basis of the Treaty of Versailles and the proposition underpinned by the Fourteen Points contained in the Peace Project unveiled in Versailles, which was embraced ever since and forms the basis of internationalism throughout the world today. The US decolonized the Philippines, despite proposals to resist because of the need to protect its national interests. Similarly, Indonesia must stand ready to decolonize West Papua. Albertini(1982), further emphasises the absence of a mechanism in the social system that will give the Indonesian government authorities and military legitimacy in West Papua. It follows that Indonesia had resisted the Dutch over the question of self-determination for West Papua because of the need to protect its national interests, and as Albertini notes, Indonesia therefore came up with a distorted history featured by the laborious negotiations, the numerous proposals and counterproposals, the ineffectual arguments, and the two Dutch police actions to justify and support its claim to represent the entire archipelago as a sovereign republic.

The Indonesian claim to represent the entire archipelago as a sovereign republic may be put into context. It was the Japanese occupation during the Second World War which created an entirely new situation, and the effects were brushed aside or not taken sufficiently into account by the Dutch government-in-exile during the period of the war. As in Indochina, the Japanese war machine dismantled European colonialism in its path. Firstly, Japan removed the colonial administration, which dealt a heavy blow to the European power in the colony.

Secondly, Japan disseminated systematic anti-Dutch propaganda, and managed to enlist the Indonesian nationalists to serve its own purposes. It pursued state formation activities which included the release of nationalist leaders from prison, formed a representative council under Sukarno, set up an Indonesian army, and created youth associations. In 1944, Japan promised independence and set up a constitutional commission which prepared the Republic of Indonesia. This Republic was proclaimed on 17 August 1945, a few days before the Japanese capitulation, by Sukarno and Hatta.

In pursuit of the exercise in state formation, Japan further organised for a constitution to be drafted, approved on short notice, and a cabinet set up. Japanese weapons were used to arm at least rudimentary forces. Much like the French in Indochina, the Dutch found themselves, at the moment when they wanted to resume their pre war position, in an impossible situation. The Dutch were faced with the *fait accompli* of a proclaimed republic controlled by the young and radical generation of nationalists who earlier refused to collaborate with the colonial power before the war and had spent several years in exile, the continuation of the pre war position confronting a dual blow due to a strong national movement and an already established republic. While the English even recognized the Republic *de facto* and called on the Dutch to begin negotiations, the Dutch saw the Republic as a regime set up by Japan, and wanted to arrest the members of the government as collaborators and traitors rather than consider them legitimate partners. By the end of 1945, there was no talk of accepting the Republic of Indonesia, and the Dutch officially ignored its existence. It was from this background that Indonesia pushed its claim to represent the entire archipelago as a sovereign republic.

At a certain point, the UN intervened, and the US blamed the Dutch having done a poor job to mediate the conflict between the Dutch and Indonesia. On 1 August 1949, a ceasefire was agreed. On 2 November, 1949, after a round table conference, an agreement was signed in The Hague. Under this agreement, the Dutch pledged itself to transfer its entire Indonesian Empire, with the exception of West New Guinea, to the United States of Indonesia. After the withdrawal of the Dutch, the Republic had, as expected, very quickly managed to assert its claim to leadership. Indonesia included West Papua as part of the Republic, because of the former colonial boundaries which existed during Dutch colonial rule. But this position had already changed through the Round Table Conference in The Hague in which under the agreement, the Dutch pledged itself to transfer its entire Indonesian Empire, with the exception of West New Guinea, to the United States of Indonesia.

As alluded to earlier, Indonesia's inclusion of West Papua as part of the Republic is consequently illegal and breaches the Round Table Conference held in The Hague on 2 November, 1949. Let us consider the fight for emancipation by West Papua in the context of the responsibility of the international community or society to protect tribal Melanesians and Pacific Islanders who are in a position to demand independence from Indonesia, and not integration or assimilation into the Indonesian Republic. Besides the US's lack of leadership imperative to free West Papua at the time, more arguments are forthcoming against such a backdrop so far to do so now, and diffuse the mindfield, which demonises the US over the failed self determination exercise in the former Dutch colony. Thus, the genesis of the Papua Conflict and the promise of freedom cherished in vain. It would follow that the Melanesian Machiavelli may provide the impetus or barometer to garner and assume the responsibility to protect doctrine by countries from the region, thus counter and put US Fraud and the Chinese Machiavelli into correct perspective. The question of the Melanesian

Machiavelli is focal to any discussion on the anatomy of the struggle by West Papua to be self-determined to determine the fate of a homeland to the 250 tribes of West Papua.

Melanesia or Asia?

The division of New Guinea between two states, indeed between two continents, can be traced back to 1828 when the Dutch proclaimed their territorial possessions ended at the 141st meridian east, roughly halfway across the large island. During the scramble for empire that also decided the colonial demarcations of Africa, New Guinea's eastern half was to be administered by German, British and, subsequently Australia colonial governments, before gaining independence in 1975 as Papua New Guinea. However, the western half of New Guinea remains a colony, having been forced in 1962-3 to swap Dutch colonialism for a much more pernicious, militarised Indonesian form. As such, this accident of colonial cartography has proved remarkably durable, and through Indonesian control officially demarcates the border between Asia and Oceania, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to its west and the Pacific Islands Forum to the east.

Indigenous Papuans are a Melanesian people in common with Pacific neighbours PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji, and are thus racially and ethnically distinct from the vast majority of the Indonesian population. With the exception of partly Polynesian contemporary Fiji, Melanesian countries are characterised by an extremely large number of indigenous ethnic groups due to geographic factors that have encouraged massive linguistic diversity and clan-based ethnic identities. In the case of New Guinea such factors include mountainous terrain, dense rainforests, steep valleys, impenetrable marshland and large distances, which have combined to create isolated communities speaking different languages and developing different cultures. Indeed, as Duane Ruth-Hefferbower(2002) found out in *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, New Guinea is home to almost 1000 indigenous languages, with a reported 267 on the Indonesian side, representing around one-sixth of the world's ethnicities. In PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu these micro-polities are so numerous that none are able to impose hegemony over others at national level. Whilst these micro-polities have often fought each other, ethnic conflict is usually restricted to a local level, unlike in sub-Saharan Africa where it has also existed at a national level, most notoriously Rwanda in 1994. Thus, according to Ben Reilly(2001) who wrote in *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management*, creating small, relatively heterogeneous single-member electoral districts or constituencies has been viewed as a potential strategy to minimise ethnic tensions at a local level in PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.

Whilst such extreme ethnic fragmentation is rare outside of Melanesia, the presence of large numbers of Indonesian settlers makes the situation in West Papua uniquely complicated. Indeed, Indonesian migrants in West Papua themselves constitute a plethora of ethnic groups, representing the archipelago's ethnic diversity. Most Indonesian settlers in West Papua come from Maluku, Sulawesi or Java. According to Stuart Upton(2009), in his study on the *Impact of Migration on the People of Papua, Indonesia, PhD thesis*, despite the diversity of both native and migrant groups, both view the distinct differences in skin tone, hair type and even diet as symptomatic of intrinsic differences that override any other ethnic categorisation.

The first wave of Indonesian migrants in the colonial era were Christian teachers, officials and professionals from the nearby territories of Maluku and North Sulawesi, who according

to C.L.M. Penders(2002), in the book *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962*, were brought in by the Dutch administration to help run the territory prior to World War II. Rodd McGibbon(2004) also wrote in the book *Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Economic Change, and the Papua Conflict* that after 1945, the Dutch forced the departure of many of these functionaries to prevent the spread of Indonesian nationalism but around 14,000 of them were still living in Dutch New Guinea in 1959, with around 8,000 being from the neighbouring Maluku archipelago. C.L.M. Penders(2002), again mentions Indonesian transmigration that took place without appropriate sanctions. He said since many of these middle-ranking officials had served the brutal Japanese occupying regime, the seeds of Papuan resentment towards Indonesian settlers had already been sown. The United Nations-administered transition period of October 1962-May 1963 effectively began the Indonesian takeover, and resulted in an influx of Indonesian civil servants and security personnel, mostly Muslims from Java. According to Robin Osborne(1985) in his book *Indonesia's Secret War: The Guerilla Struggle in Irian Jaya*, this too caused resentment since they replaced Papuans who had been trained under the Dutch for self-governance. In February 1966 a hundred Javanese families set sail for the territory, thus slowly beginning the West Papua chapter of Indonesia's nationwide transmigration programme, which subsidised families to move from overcrowded regions to less-populated parts of the archipelago. Thomas Leinbach et al(1992) establishes in 'Employment Behavior and the Family in Indonesia Transmigration,' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, the gravity of the problem of transmigration in West Papua. He reveals that between 1969 and 1989, the programme moved some 730,000 families from Java, Madura and Bali to Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and West Papua.

The transmigration policy reached its zenith in the 1980s, and the number of 'official transmigrants' in West Papua is now dwarfed by 'spontaneous transmigrants' who migrated internally with little or no government help. This constitutes two separate patterns of migration since many of the largely Muslim Javanese official transmigrants were originally settled in rural areas where few other migrants ventured. Stuart Upton(2009), wrote in 'A disaster, but not genocide', *Inside Indonesia*, that the self-funded migrants originate mainly from eastern Indonesia, mostly Muslims and Christians from Sulawesi and Maluku who usually settle in urban areas along the coast. It is these self-funded migrants whose numbers are rising vertiginously. In addition to spontaneous economic migration, other drivers of contemporary Indonesian migration into West Papua are the expansion of the bureaucracy that accompanies the national decentralisation process and large-scale agricultural ventures such as palm oil plantations and the proposed Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate. Plans to convert even more land to palm oil and other plantation crops will likely increase the rate of migrant population growth. By contrast, the indigenous Papuan population is unlikely to grow much faster in light of poor healthcare in rural areas and much higher rates of HIV among indigenous Papuans than Indonesian migrants.

One particular difficulty that would immediately confront policy makers in an independent West Papua is the fact that the territory has become divided into two realms - of the (mostly coastal) towns and cities, where migrants constitute the majority and dominate all commercial activity; and the rural interior, which is overwhelmingly Papuan, employed in subsistence farming and often only loosely connected to the modern, cash and international economy. For example, data from the 2000 census shows that in Mimika regency, where the huge Freeport gold and copper mine operates, those born outside of the regency made up some 57% of the population and in Jayapura regency, the territory's biggest urban centre,

they constituted 58%. Whilst the towns and cities are relatively prosperous by Indonesian standards, the countryside is populated by an underclass of indigenous tribes who suffer the worst living standards in Indonesia. Since the coastal areas contain most of West Papua's industries and work opportunities in the formal economy, they also attract better-educated Indonesian settlers who invariably secure the best private sector positions. For instance, it has been estimated that these migrants possess more than 90% of all trading jobs in the territory, and they also dominate the manufacturing sector.

Papuan rural to urban migration in search of employment actually predates the Indonesian takeover since it began during the Allied war effort and increased with the Dutch expansion of government after their return in September 1945. Wage labour for the war effort and subsequently the Dutch colonial administration was the major form of employment for almost twenty years but such opportunities became scarcer for indigenous Papuans after the Indonesian takeover, forcing many back into a subsistence lifestyle. Migrant domination of the coastal towns and cities continues to crowd out indigenous Papuan migration to urban areas, thus reducing their employment opportunities in the formal, cash economy. Indeed, as migrants continue to arrive they consolidate existing ethnic networks, which are vital for gaining choice employment in Indonesia. Given the relative paucity of the indigenous business class, such ethnic networks work against Papuan job hunters, with the result that Papuans continue to work mainly in subsistence farming. Exacerbating this divide, migrants have also achieved greater success in commercial agriculture, allowing them to take control of local markets. This reality is already a significant issue for both provincial administrations to handle, and has prompted calls for positive discrimination for indigenous Papuans to better compete in the job market. How an independent West Papua deals with this problem would likely have a substantial bearing on the stability and viability of the nascent nation state.

Failed states

Chauvet, Collier and Hoeffler(2007), in 'Paradise Lost : The Costs of State Failure in the Pacific', *UNU-WIDER Research Paper 16* estimated the total cost of failing states at around US\$276 billion annually in lost GDP, with Pacific island nations accounting for US\$36 billion of that. The Failed States Index, which perhaps should be described as the failing states index, defines a failed state as "one in which the government does not have effective control of its territory, is not perceived as legitimate by a significant portion of its population, does not provide domestic security or basic public services to its citizens, and lacks a monopoly on the use of force." In the 2011 Index some 177 sovereign states are ranked on their vulnerability to collapse according to 12 indicators, among them conflict, corruption, demographic pressures, poverty and inequality. The rankings are headed by Somalia and dominated by countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Timor-Leste was perceived to be the most vulnerable state among West Papua's neighbours, although its 23rd place ranking reflects an improvement in its domestic security situation since 2008. The Solomon Islands was ranked 49, PNG 54, Indonesia 64 and Fiji 68.

Whilst the spill over effects of state failure to their neighbours are reduced since Pacific countries are islands, Chauvet et al (2007), again warn that "The cost of failure might be higher than average in small islands because they are atypically highly exposed to the global economy". This is largely due to the fact that, as Chauvet et al (2007), further pointed out, "Both capital and labour are likely to be highly mobile internationally in small islands." The implication is that the residents of the country itself shoulder most costs of state failure in the

Pacific, in contrast to other regions where the spill over effects to neighbours is much higher. The same research calculated that over a 20-year period the total cost of such state failure in PNG amounted to some US\$33.5 billion, or around US\$1.7 billion in lost GDP per annum, whilst in the smaller Solomon Islands it reached US\$2.2 billion, equivalent to US\$0.1 billion per year. If correct, this hypothesis suggests that state failure could be particularly damaging to an independent West Papua trying to find its feet.

Failed states are usually characterised by high political instability; rampant corruption; dysfunctional economies; collapse of government services; breakdown of law and order; internal conflicts; and loss of state authority and legitimacy. Such state paralysis allows local and traditional leaders to displace the state's power in their respective areas, and the state becomes effectively unified in name only. In Melanesia's case a youth bulge also further threatens stability, and PNG and the Solomon Islands are the states most closely associated with state failure within the whole Pacific islands region which also encompasses Polynesia and Micronesia. In both countries high crime rates, extensive political corruption and rampant tribalism are becoming increasingly threatening. An analysis of the present situation in West Papua has shown that the pressing issues gripping its neighbours would likely affect an independent West Papua too.

Political Instability

Firstly, indigenous Papuans in an independent West Papua, like other Melanesian people in common with Pacific neighbours PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji, and who are thus racially and ethnically distinct from the vast majority of the Indonesian population, are dared to contain political instability. Garth Luke in 'Australian Aid: A Mixed Bag', *Australian Council for International Development (ACFID)* has noted political instability in the Pacific Region. Moreover, as Peter Savage(1978) notes in 'The Nationalist Struggle in West Irian: The Divisions Within the Liberation', *Journal of Sociology*, the history of the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM, or Free Papua Movement), the territory's main armed resistance movement since 1965, has been riddled with internal ethnic rivalries that have compromised the group's effectiveness.

Corruption

Secondly, indigenous Papuans in an independent West Papua, like other Melanesian people in common with Pacific neighbours PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji, and who are thus racially and ethnically distinct from the vast majority of the Indonesian population, are challenged to address corruption. The challenge to derail corruption in Melanesian states is real (Richard Robison, 2006; Jaap Timmer, 2007; Peter Savage, 1978; The World Bank, 2009; J. Budi Hernawan, 2011; Richard Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakt, 2004; Richard Chauvel, 2005; Jakarta Post, August 7, 2011; and The International Crisis Group, 2007). Thus, Richard Robison(2006) asserts in 'Corruption, collusion and nepotism after Suharto: Indonesia's past or future?', *IIAS Newsletter 40*, that Indonesia's reputation for corruption is well founded too, with many observers arguing that it has actually worsened and become more diffuse since Suharto's fall in 1998.

Jaap Timmer(2007), states in 'Erring Decentralisation and Elite Politics in Papua' in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds.), *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, that although real efforts to employ more Papuans in government

service only began in the late 1990s, as a result of Special Autonomy, it was estimated in 2005 that around 35% of the civil service was indigenous Papuan. Peter Savage(1978), further notes that this contrasts with Dutch efforts that had Papuans comprising around 30% of the civil service in 1957 and around 75% in September 1962 on the eve of the Dutch departure. The World Bank(2009), in the report, *Investing in the Future of Papua and West Papua: Infrastructure for Sustainable Development*, called into question the process of state intervention and planning, thus generating a crisis of legitimacy. J. Budi Hernawan(2011), wrote in *Managing Papuan Expectations. After Handing Back Special Autonomy* of similar misgivings. Richard Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakt(2004) noted in *The Papua Conflict: Jakarta's Perceptions and Policies*, the adverse impact of the very process of state intervention and planning which systematically interferes in citizens' private lives thus generating a trend of an increasing crisis of legitimacy.

According to Richard Chauvel(2005), in the book *Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity and Adaption*, the rioting over the proposed establishment of Central Irian Jaya province prompted elites from Biak and Nabire to argue that their regions would be a safer choice to site the new province's capital. Indeed, as Jaap Timmer(2007), again suggests, "Highlanders and people from the south-coastal regions (Mimika, Merauke) are often consumed with envy about the power enjoyed by northern coastal elites who have a remarkable acquaintance with Indonesian ways of doing politics". The Jakarta Post(August 7, 2011) carried a report, *SBY to discuss formation of new Central Papua province*, which suggested that this could yet affect political stability in the territory since the proposal to create Central Papua province is now back on the agenda, comprising 14 regencies with Biak as the capital and Dick Henk Wabiser, a retired admiral from Biak as the acting governor. The International Crisis Group(2007), stressed in 'Indonesian Papua: A Local Perspective on the Conflict', *Asia Briefing 66*, that this proposed new province has also been home to locally significant tribal rivalries since Merauke was divided into four districts in 2002.

Whilst the Papuan spring of 1999-2000 seemed to indicate that over thirty years of Indonesian rule had inculcated a genuine pan-Papuan national identity, in contrast to neighbouring PNG, in which, as Richard Chauvel and Ikrar Nusa Bhakti(2004), again note, "local support for partition demonstrates that Papuan unity is fragile and the development of a coherent territory wide identity remains a work in progress". Jaap Timmer(2007), again writes that so widespread has this trend become that one cannot help but conclude simply that, "ethnic differences play a significant and sometimes alarming role in land and resource politics". Just as in other Melanesian states, these rivalries are playing an increasingly visible role in West Papuan politics, not just between different indigenous groups but also between Papuans and Indonesian settlers. These developments indicate that corruption and political instability would be a further challenge for an independent West Papua authority to overcome.

Poor government services

Thirdly, indigenous Papuans in an independent West Papua, like other Melanesian people in common with Pacific neighbours PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji, and who are thus racially and ethnically distinct from the vast majority of the Indonesian population, are contested to deliver government services. There are available research findings on the task confronting Melanesian states in ensuring efficient delivery of government services (Alexandre Marc, 2010; World Bank, 2005; VIVA News, June 7, 2011;

World Bank, 2006; Stuart Upton, 2009; United Nations Development Program, 2004; Elisabeth Oktofan, 2010; United Nations Development Program, 2010; Badan Pusat Statistik Papua ; Badan Pusat Statistik Republik Indonesia, and Hela Hengene Payani, 2000). Indeed, Alexandre Marc(2010) in *Delivering Services in Multicultural Societies*, implied, there is evidence that public service delivery is more problematic in multiethnic democracies. Indeed, as Stuart Upton(2006), again writes, primary school teachers without administrative experience are running agriculture departments. At the very least, this illustrates that Papuans badly need better education services. Moreover, the World Bank(2005), in *Papua Public Expenditure Analysis*, reported on the poor delivery of public services, especially in rural areas where indigenous Papuans predominate.

According to VIVA News(June 7, 2011), in an article, *Ten Regencies Score Poor Governance Index*, districts and cities in West Papua and Maluku comprised nine of the 10 worst ranking units in the survey, with Waropen reGENCY in Papua province rated the worst of all. Interestingly, in a list dominated by districts in Java and Sumatra, Sorong in West Papua province was rated fifth best in the Index. The World Bank(2006), in *Indonesia Poverty Analysis Program*, refers to the nature of capitalist or industrial development and the apparent struggle by authorities to inspire social development in West Papua. Moreover, as Stuart Upton(2009), again notes that even indigenous urban residents are still twice as likely as migrants to have little or no formal schooling, a disparity that was first recorded in the 1970s.

The United Nations Development Program (2004), in *Indonesia Human Development Report 2004*, reached similar conclusions. Thus, as Elisabeth Oktofan(2010) reports in 'Magelang Scores High, Papua Low In Health Survey', *The Jakarta Globe*, of the lowest 20 districts across the country 14 are found in eastern Indonesia, mostly in Papua province. The UNDP Report(2010), notes that the territory has the highest per capita rate of HIV/AIDS infection in Indonesia at 2.4%, well above the national average of 0.2%, with aid agencies critical of the government's lack of response. Malaria and tuberculosis rates exceed national figures also.

Badan Pusat Statistik Papua (Statistics Papua) found that as a result of poor government performance in education, health and welfare, West Papua also continues to post the lowest human development index (HDI) scores in Indonesia, along with the country's widest variation in district HDIs. Badan Pusat Statistik Papua (Statistics Papua) again called into question the poor government performance in education, health and welfare in West Papua in which it also continues to post the lowest human development index (HDI) scores in Indonesia, along with the country's widest variation in district HDIs.

Whilst it can be argued that much of this disparity is due to the Dutch colonial legacy and the difficulties in delivering basic services in remote areas, the United Nations Development Program(2004), in *Indonesia Human Development Report 2004*, further concluded that these figures are "a clear indication that the income from Papua's natural resources has not been invested sufficiently in services for the people".

Badan Pusat Statistik Republik Indonesia (Statistics Indonesia) revealed that whilst both provinces in the territory continue to post HDI outcomes well below the Indonesian national average, their scores since 1999 have shown an upward trend, although how much of this is the product of rising rates of in-migration is difficult to quantify. For instance, Papua province's HDI rose from 58.80 in 1999 to 64.53 in 2009, whilst that of West Papua province was 63.7 in 2004 and 68.58 by 2009. By contrast, the Indonesian national average was 64.3

in 1999, and had risen to 71.76 in 2009. Over the border in PNG, HDI figures have been consistently lower than those of West Papua with worse results in all the key indicators of life expectancy, literacy and per capita GDP. Nevertheless, the existence of large rural to urban variations and high numbers of migrants in West Papua make any direct comparisons between the indigenous populations of PNG and West Papua difficult.

Hela Hengene Payani(2000), in 'Selected Problems in the Papua New Guinean Public Service', *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, further writes of the concern over poor service delivery in Papua New Guinea.

Dysfunctional economies

Fourthly, indigenous Papuans in an independent West Papua, like other Melanesian people in common with Pacific neighbours PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji, and who are thus racially and ethnically distinct from the vast majority of the Indonesian population, are tasked to revamp dysfunctional economies. There are research authorities who have documented the dysfunctional economies seen in Melanesia(Hela Hengene Payani, 2000; Budy Resosudarmo, Lydia Napitupulu and Chris Manning, 2009; Ron Crocombe, 2007; EIA and Telapak, 2010; South China Morning Post, November 14, 2004; Ron Duncan and Ila Temu, 1997; Chris Ballard, 2002; Matthew Allen, and Sinclair Dinnen, 2010; The World Bank, 2006; Asian Development Bank, 2009; Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, 2008; and Tim Anderson, 2010). Thus, Hela Hengene Payani(2000), again in association with the Asian Development Bank, noted that, "PNG, Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste are finding it difficult to diversify and stimulate growth beyond exploitation of non-renewable oil, minerals, and forests." The enclave nature of mining and fossil fuel extraction in particular exacerbates the large imbalances in West Papua's economy and ensures the benefits are not distributed equitably. Indeed, as Budy Resosudarmo, Lydia Napitupulu and Chris Manning(2009), again highlighted, much of these windfall gains are highly concentrated in a few regions to the detriment of the rest of the territory.

According to Ron Crocombe(2007), who writes in *Asia in the Pacific: Replacing the West*, a large underground economy is another feature of a failing state, and in both PNG and West Papua, the growing Asian presence in resource extraction, hotels and other commercial enterprises has resulted in rising levels of corruption and organised crime.

Illegal logging is particularly lucrative since New Guinea is home to the world's third largest tropical forest, surpassed only by the Amazon and Congo Basins. As such, it is home to the last undisturbed large-scale forest in the Asia-Pacific, and as commercial timber stocks in Sumatra and Borneo are increasingly depleted the Indonesian and Malaysian logging industry has turned its attention towards West Papua and PNG. EIA and Telapak(2010) note in *Rogue Traders: The Murky Business of Merbau Timber Smuggling in Indonesia*, that Indonesia's Ministry of Forestry conceded around 25% of West Papua's forests have fallen to legal and illegal loggers since the late 1990s, with the forested area falling from 32 million hectares to 23 million hectares. In PNG it is widely estimated that some 70-90% of all the country's logging is illegal, much of it due to the Malaysian firms that dominate the country's timber industry.

South China Morning Post(2004, November 14) carried a report entitled, *Indonesia: Illegal Loggers Turn to Papua*, which found that China, having already reduced its own logging due

to environmental concerns, is the biggest market for Papuan timber. Again, Ron Duncan and Ila Temu(1997), mention in 'Trade, investment and sustainable development of natural resources in the Pacific: the case of fish and timber', in *Enhancing cooperation in trade and investment between Pacific Island Countries and economies of East and South-East Asia*, that the situation in West Papua is thus reminiscent of a pattern that has been repeated across Melanesia whereby, "Assignment of the right to sign logging contracts to tribal chiefs or 'big men' has led to a situation where rights to harvest are granted by landowners in return for a pittance, in terms of their share of the revenue in excess of logging costs". Indeed, corruption in the logging industry has become embedded in post-independence Melanesian politics as it provides significant revenues for local leaders to distribute to their supporters.

Chris Ballard(2002), writes in 'The Denial of Traditional Land Rights in West Papua', *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, that Wasior in West Papua province has been the scene of particularly violent conflicts between timber companies and locals protesting the lack of compensation, which has resulted in retaliatory action by elite police paramilitary brigades that forced around 5,000 locals from their homes. According to Chris Ballard(2002), again, an earlier cable from 2006 cited a PNG government official as saying that the TNI is "involved in both illegal logging and drug smuggling in PNG."

Matthew Allen, and Sinclair Dinnen(2010), in 'The North down under: antinomies of conflict and intervention in Solomon Islands', *Conflict, Security & Development*, confirm that at present logging composes around 70 to 80% of the country's exports by value but recent estimates suggest that forestry reserves will be depleted by 2014. The inevitable collapse of the logging industry in the Solomon Islands could likely result in an economic shock to the fragile state and might even lead to another uprising, as in the late 1990s. As such, logging is a major source of political instability in the Solomon Islands, and similar tensions are visible in West Papua too, with many local communities resentful of logging firms and their Indonesian settler staff.

Addiction to foreign aid is another characteristic of a dysfunctional economy, and many of West Papua's neighbours exhibit symptoms in which foreign aid paves the way for a dysfunctional economy. The World Bank(2006), revealed in *World Development Indicators 2011*, for example, that in recent years foreign aid has constituted over 60% of the Solomon Islands' development budget, and it was one of the world's top three aid dependent countries between 2005 and 2007. Asian Development Bank (2009), in *ADB's Pacific Approach 2010-2014*, unmasks a dysfunctional economy, which finds favours and exhibits symptoms amongst many of West Papua's neighbours. Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol(2008), in 'The Curse of Aid', *Journal of Economic Growth*, cite findings on the nature and role of the state within societies which require state planning in the economic system.

Tim Anderson(2010) in 'Land reform' in Timor Leste? Why the Constitution is worth defending', in Michael Leach, Nuno Canas Mendes, Antero B. da Silva, Alarico da Costa Ximenes and Bob Boughton (Eds), *Understanding Timor-Leste*, writes an account of aid agencies and the role of a critical issue like land ownership seen as vital in any emerging Papuan state pursuing industrial development.

Breakdown of law and order

Fifthly, indigenous Papuans in an independent West Papua, like other Melanesian people in common with Pacific neighbours PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji, and who are thus racially and ethnically distinct from the vast majority of the Indonesian population, are confronted with a situation of breakdown in law and order. The findings of the breakdown of law and order have been documented(Sinclair Dinnen, Abby McLeod and Gordon Peake, 2006; Philip Alpers, 2008; Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2011; and Jim Elmslie, 2010). In the last decade Australian military and police have intervened in the fragile states of PNG, Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste to counter a downward spiral in law and order. Sinclair Dinnen, Abby McLeod and Gordon Peake(2006), in 'Police-building in Weak States: Australian Approaches in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands', *Civil Wars*, notes for instance, that the Australian presence in the Solomon Islands has resulted in the removal of around 25% of the Solomons police force, with a large number of those charged with criminal offences. The withdrawal of Indonesia's repressive security apparatus would invariably leave a vacuum in an independent West Papua, and would quite likely require the dispatch of international peacekeepers as in Timor-Leste. A home-grown security apparatus in West Papua would be much smaller than that of Indonesia. Developing a competent Papuan police force would be one of the first challenges to address since the only positive legacy of the suffocating Indonesian security presence has been to keep a lid on some of the law and order issues that have beset neighbouring PNG.

Philip Alpers(2008), in 'Papua New Guinea: Small Numbers, Big Fuss, Real Results' *Contemporary Security Policy*, wrote about the breakdown of law and order attributed to the proliferation in illicit firearms. According to Alpers, the situation is such that "Largely as a consequence of the ready availability of small arms, Papua New Guinea is widely identified as the tinderbox of the south-west Pacific." Again, the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (2011), in *Statistics for Development*, revealed that Melanesia is currently experiencing both the highest population growth rates and the fastest urbanisation rates in the whole Pacific.

Jim Elmslie(2010), in '*West Papuan Demographic Transition and the 2010 Indonesian Census: "Slow Motion Genocide" or not?*', points to anecdotal evidence which suggests that the pace of growth by 2010 had surpassed the yearly average of 5.09%, meaning that the rate of migration into West Papua could be continually rising. Given West Papua's relatively small population in comparison with Indonesia as a whole, even relatively low levels of migration from other regions can deliver dramatic demographic change.

State legitimacy

Sixthly, indigenous Papuans in an independent West Papua, like other Melanesian people in common with Pacific neighbours PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji, and who are thus racially and ethnically distinct from the vast majority of the Indonesian population, ought to defy loss of state authority and legitimacy that is occurring throughout much of Melanesia. The state legitimacy question throughout much of Melanesia has been studied (Jim Elmslie(2010); Nicholas Thomas and Ton Otto (eds)(1997); Nicholas Thomas and Ton Otto (eds)(1997); John Vail(2007); and Rory Ewin(1999). Indeed, as Jim Elmslie(2010), in '*West Papuan Demographic Transition and the 2010 Indonesian Census: "Slow Motion Genocide" or not?*', state weakness seems ingrained throughout the region, the deep lying reasons for which would likely be replicated in an independent West Papua.

In West Papua's case, the most visible state presence in many rural areas is a military one. Nicholas Thomas and Ton Otto (eds)(1997) stress in *Narratives of Nation in the South Pacific*, that viewed from this perspective, Melanesian countries have not been experiencing state collapse but the absence of actual state formation. Indeed, some anthropologists have even questioned the very necessity of the state in Melanesia in light of its poor performance and the region's long history of largely autonomous local communities.

John Vail(2007), in 'Community-Based Development in Tari - Present and Prospects' in Nicole Haley & R.J May (eds.), *Conflict and Resource Development in the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea*, abbreviates the success of state intervention in the economic system with the reality of state legitimacy and the problem of political representation and consent. Vail explains that perhaps the most visible evidence of state existence throughout much of Melanesia are elections which, in parts of PNG for example, are increasingly plagued by a regularisation of illegality which exacts a further toll on state legitimacy. Again, as Rory Ewin(1999), notes in *The Bougainville Conflict, Lecture to the Australian Defence Force Academy*, whilst Port Moresby reaped a 20% share of the profits from the mining venture, Bougainville itself received only 0.5% - 1.25%.

Internal conflict

Finally, indigenous Papuans in an independent West Papua, like other Melanesian people in common with Pacific neighbours PNG, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji, and who are thus racially and ethnically distinct from the vast majority of the Indonesian population, are challenged to stem, and reign in internal conflict. It has been shown through research that internal conflict is a one of the tasks of the Melanesian state to contain(Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, 2007; Gerry van Klinken, 2007; The International Crisis Group, 2008; Lorraine Aragon, 2007; Matthew Allen, and Sinclair Dinnen, 2010; Henrik Urdal and Kristian Hoelscher, 2009; and International Organization for Migration, 2008). Indeed, Lisa Chauvet, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler(2007), again take issue with the political process, in which people try to gain access to political power and to wield this for their own or group ends. It was asserted that although 27% of all countries are islands, only 5% of all civil wars occurred in such states. These statistics suggest that an independent West Papua has a relatively low risk of experiencing civil war but the territory's delicate demographic balance between indigenous Papuans and Indonesian settlers is a cause for concern given the recent history of racial and ethnic tensions across both eastern Indonesia and Melanesia.

The fall of Suharto, and the subsequent decentralisation of local government, was accompanied by greater competition for state resources and frequently erupted into ethnic violence in eastern Indonesia. These six separate communal conflicts affected the provinces of West Kalimantan (twice), Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku, and can be broadly categorised into violence either between indigenous and migrant groups or between Christians and Muslims. They accounted for around 9,000 deaths in the years 1996-2002. Gerry van Klinken(2007), in the book, *Communal Violence and Democratization in Indonesia: Small Town Wars*, attributes all these communal conflicts in Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Maluku to the political process, in which people try to gain access to political power and to wield this for their own or group ends led by politically active individuals from the lower middle class in provincial or district capitals, places that were heavily reliant on state funding.

The International Crisis Group(2008), in 'Indonesia: Communal Tensions in Papua' *Asia Report 154, June 16*, makes mention of the rising tensions between Muslims and Christians in certain parts of the territory. Lorraine Aragon(2007), in 'Elite Competition in Central Sulawesi' in Henk Schulte Nordholt and Gerry van Klinken (eds.), *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, focused on internal conflict in the political process, in which people try to gain access to political power and to wield this for their own or group ends. Aragon states that as members of the national majority religion and now a majority in Poso itself, it appears that Muslim elites felt, "entitled to dwell anywhere in the district and control its political and business fortunes".

For Aragon (2007), the conflicts in Central Sulawesi and elsewhere in eastern Indonesia during this period were caused by a nexus of "bureaucratic corruption, ethnic inequities, migration patterns, land alienation, changes in global markets for cash crops, religious proselytising, and partisan media narratives". This process might be repeated in West Papua given that the creation of new administrative divisions under decentralisation has already increased the risk of divisive communal mobilisation. As Matthew Allen, and Sinclair Dinnen(2010), in 'The North down under: antinomies of conflict and intervention in Solomon Islands', *Conflict, Security & Development*, again note, whilst undoubtedly some of the violence was fuelled by criminality and individual greed, the social, cultural and economic effects of internal migration and the disruption triggered by resource development schemes on Guadalcanal were also factors.

Henrik Urdal and Kristian Hoelscher(2009) in 'Urban Youth Bulges and Social Disorder: An Empirical Study of Asian and Sub-Saharan African Cities', *Policy Research Working Paper*, for example, cite a lack of democracy, stagnant economic growth and low secondary education attainment in males aged 20-24 as having more explanatory power than merely the existence of a youth bulge. It appears that a large young population is one more factor that exacerbates conflict risk in developing countries where migration patterns, poor governance, slow economic growth, a high share of resource exports in GDP, and low education levels also contribute to the outbreak of vertical or horizontal violence.

International Organization for Migration(2008), in 'Situation Report on International Migration in East and South-East Asia', *Final Report*, notes that as in the Solomon Islands, urban migration can inflame communal tensions because cities across the developing world generally lack the infrastructure, resources, or employment opportunities to cope with an in pouring of rural workers.

Conclusion and discussion

State failure imposes significant costs globally, and this paper has outlined some of the pressing governance and development issues being faced by West Papua and its neighbours PNG, Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, all three of whom have been labelled as failing states in the past decade. These issues include chronic political instability; rampant corruption; dysfunctional economies; collapse of government services; breakdown of law and order; internal conflicts; and loss of state authority and legitimacy. The conclusions which flow from the above could be stated.

Firstly, just as the level of violence and human rights abuse in Timor-Leste has diminished with the departure of the Indonesian security apparatus, it would be expected that most indigenous Papuans would benefit from a similar removal.

Whilst some of these problems can be partly attributed to the colonial legacy, the political establishment and the civil service have also woefully underperformed since independence, despite the fact that military takeovers have only been confined to Fiji. Since it is already exhibiting many similar symptoms of state failure as its neighbours, an independent West Papua might become even more vulnerable, especially since numerous communal conflicts erupted across eastern Indonesia during the post-Suharto transition. Empirical research also indicates that failing states in the Pacific seem to suffer greater loss of GDP than failing states elsewhere. However, just as the level of violence and human rights abuse in Timor-Leste has diminished with the departure of the Indonesian security apparatus, it would be expected that most indigenous Papuans would benefit from a similar removal.

Secondly, further consolidation of a cohesive pan-Papuan identity would be vital for any nascent West Papuan state to avoid the some of the nation-building issues that have beset its neighbours, in particular PNG, Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands.

Indeed, a decade ago it appeared that West Papua might follow Timor-Leste, formerly another territory in eastern Indonesia whose annexation was highly controversial, in finally achieving statehood. The Papuan Spring of 1999-2000 was significant because it demonstrated that a genuine pan-Papuan identity had apparently been formed in response to the harshness of Indonesian rule. Whilst the Dutch cultivated a Papuan elite and helped construct a pan-Papuan identity separate to that of Indonesia, Papuan nationalism has since been consolidated among historically disparate ethnic groups to an extent not apparent in neighbouring PNG. Thus, almost fifty years of Indonesian control has ensured that West Papua is quite a different society from PNG, which is still riven with tribal conflict and discord. Centrifugal weakness in Jakarta in 1998-2001 presented an opportunity for a widely representative group of Papuan political leaders to push for the territory's independence under the banner of pan-Papuan nationalism. However, as Richard Chauvel(2005), again poses, Indonesia's subsequent co-opting of indigenous leaders through the decentralisation and regional autonomy process has seemingly heightened intra-Papuan ethnic rivalries indicating that, "regional and tribal interests remain politically salient". Further consolidation of a cohesive pan-Papuan identity would be vital for any nascent West Papuan state to avoid the some of the nation-building issues that have beset its neighbours, in particular PNG, Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands.

Thirdly, whilst Indonesia has strengthened its grip on the territory since 2000, South Sudan's recent referendum on independence will give some succour to those who have campaigned for a similar outcome in West Papua, particularly since the two cases have numerous historical parallels.

Enmity between the north and south of Sudan goes back hundreds of years to the exploitation of African slaves from the south by northern Arab slave traders. Likewise, Arab and Malay traders took slaves from coastal West Papua from around the 15th century until the Dutch arrival in the mid-19th century, and Biak became an island staging post for the eastern slave trade, similar to Zanzibar during the same period. Colonial policy also cemented regional cleavages in both Sudan and West New Guinea. In 1924 the British essentially divided Sudan

into two separate territories, along rather arbitrary lines of latitude, accompanied by laws that limited people movement between the two zones. The north comprised a largely Muslim Arab population, whilst the south largely consisted of a predominantly animist African population where Islam was making significant inroads. This division restricted Arab and Islamic influence from the north, and under British tutelage European and American missionary activities expanded. Likewise, in West Papua the spread of Islam was limited to a few coastal settlements, notably Fak-Fak, which had contact with the Maluku archipelago. The subsequent Dutch colonial presence effectively quarantined New Guinea from further Muslim influence as Christian missions expanded throughout the territory, among which American evangelists became the most prominent.

The decolonisation of both South Sudan and West Papua also offers numerous parallels, since southern aspirations went unheard during the process that led to Sudan's independence in 1956, and were largely marginalised by subsequent governments. Likewise, no Papuan representatives were consulted during the negotiations that sealed the New York Agreement of August 1962 and the territory's transfer to Indonesia. By the early 1960s there were very few Papuans who advocated union with Indonesia given that any prospect of a federal state had vanished in 1950. Meanwhile, Sudanese independence in 1956 was ruined by a brutal civil war between north and south, which lasted from 1955 to 1972, triggered by the Arab-led government renegeing on promises to create a federal system. The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement finally granted the south considerable autonomy and a relative peace lasted until 1983 when Khartoum imposed new Islamic laws on all of Sudan, including the south. The second civil war officially ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005 and specified that a referendum be later held to determine whether South Sudan should separate from Sudan. Almost 99% of votes cast were in favour.

Thirdly, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement can be seen as a long-overdue effort to repair one of the most troublesome postcolonial borders, and the ramifications might extend far beyond Africa. Numerous other states in Asia and the Pacific are also colonial creations whose borders often cut arbitrarily across tribes, ethnicities, religions and traditional alliances.

The internationally brokered Sudan peace process was the first time other African states, long fearful of similar secession movements within their own borders, countenanced the partition of colonial successor states on the continent. Thus, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement can be seen as a long-overdue effort to repair one of the most troublesome postcolonial borders, and the ramifications might extend far beyond Africa. Numerous other states in Asia and the Pacific are also colonial creations whose borders often cut arbitrarily across tribes, ethnicities, religions and traditional alliances. As a result, across Africa and the Asia-Pacific long-standing enemies have sometimes been forced into the same nation states, whilst official boundaries have also divided clans and families across different countries where they speak different colonial languages. In the case of New Guinea the invisible border between PNG and Indonesia is not recognised by many of the indigenous people living there who cross it regularly as part of their subsistence farming lifestyles.

If the partition of Sudan brings lasting peace to one of the world's most fractious conflict zones, it is a solution that the international community could conceivably apply in other disputed conflict zones. However, plebiscites and acts of self-determination can also foment new problems as they did in the former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s when

independence declarations by some of its constituent parts lead to civil wars as Serbian minorities within these new states fought to re-establish Serbian sovereignty. Since the Papuan Spring of 1999-2000 the numbers of Indonesian settlers in West Papua have grown so fast that indigenous Papuans recently became a minority in their homeland. Given this population balance, any referendum would have to be handled very delicately. If allowed to vote, it is highly likely that Indonesian migrants would scupper any chance of independence by voting for continuing union with Indonesia. During Timor-Leste's referendum in 1999, Indonesian migrants were excluded from the voter registration process at a time when they constituted around 10% of the territory's population. Even if it were possible to screen out more than 50% of the population, a vote for Papuan independence would likely provoke a violent retaliation from pro-Indonesian societal forces. Moreover, Indonesian migrants in West Papua now constitute the backbone of the local economy and any moves towards independence would therefore involve some capital flight from the territory. Given West Papua's history of human rights abuses and militia organising, it would be surprising if the military remained neutral, especially since many veterans of the destruction of East Timor have since done tours in West Papua. Given the costs and risks associated with independence it is perhaps worth exploring other options for the territory, at least in the short to medium-term.

Fourthly, given the costs and risks associated with independence it is perhaps worth exploring other options for the territory, at least in the short to medium-term in a well run, democratic Indonesian state might still be able to accommodate Papuan aspirations within a properly implemented local autonomy package.

This is supported by discourses now available given the costs and risks associated with independence it is perhaps worth exploring other options for the territory, at least in the short to medium-term in a well run, democratic Indonesian state might still be able to accommodate Papuan aspirations within a properly implemented local autonomy package (Edward Aspinall, 2006; and Marcus Mietzner, 2009). Thus, Edward Aspinall (2006), in 'Selective Outrage and Unacknowledged Fantasies: Re-thinking Papua, Indonesia and Australia', *Policy and Society* suggests that even if West Papua were not to realise its independence anytime soon, it could be argued that a well run, democratic Indonesian state might still be able to accommodate Papuan aspirations within a properly implemented local autonomy package. This perception ignores the fact that such an Indonesian state has yet to emerge, and progress towards such an outcome appears stalled. Nonetheless, many Papuans initially welcomed Special Autonomy enthusiastically, although these hopes have been largely dashed and human rights abuses remain common. Despite a decrease in state coercion in most of Indonesia since the fall of the authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998, many Papuan cultural symbols remain banned, Papuan civil society remains under tight surveillance and around 100 Papuan political prisoners languish in jail. Even though West Papua now receives much bigger revenues than under Suharto, Indonesia has missed an opportunity to build trust among the indigenous population with its half-hearted approach to implementing other aspects of Special Autonomy.

Marcus Mietzner (2009), again, explains that to win greater support among Papuans the Indonesian state should sincerely respond to some of their grievances. In 2009 the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) unveiled the 'Papua Road Map', which aims to address Papuan grievances while keeping the territory inside Indonesia. The proposal blends four approaches, namely recognition, development, dialogue and reconciliation. The first recognises Papuans

as traditional 'owners' of the land, a long held grievance but one in which other countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand could offer a model. Papuan cultural symbols and traditions must also be properly recognised, as part of Indonesia's rich multiculturalism. The development aspect should involve some form of affirmative action and education to stimulate a Papuan business class. Programmes that attempt to close the gap between migrant and indigenous Papuans in health and life expectancy are also vital. Both sides must also sincerely pursue dialogue, preferably with an international mediator. Although Jakarta has long been wary of internationalising the Papua issue, a precedent does exist in the Aceh peace process, which involved two separate international mediators and culminated in a successful conclusion. As in Aceh, reconciliation is likely to be the biggest challenge in any efforts to peacefully consolidate West Papua within Indonesia although the Aceh peace deal has many lessons that can be applied to West Papua.

Fifthly, as in Aceh, reconciliation is likely to be the biggest challenge in any efforts to peacefully consolidate West Papua within Indonesia although the Aceh peace deal has many lessons that can be applied to West Papua.

A symbolic first step towards reconciliation in West Papua would be to grant amnesties to political prisoners, particularly to those who were demanding welfare improvements rather than independence. Many Papuans have served prison terms for peacefully protesting corruption in West Papua, which has increased as decentralisation and Special Autonomy have resulted in much larger state revenues. Another essential move would be to properly apply the rule of law, particularly with respect to the military who continue to enjoy virtual impunity in the territory. Any officials proven to have been complicit in human rights abuses would at least need to be removed from their posts, and preferably jailed. The Aceh peace agreement also mandated the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission that intended to acknowledge victims and their suffering. Marcus Mietzner(2009), further finds that whilst such a move would undoubtedly promote reconciliation with Indonesia among Papuans, backsliding has prevented its proper implementation in Aceh. A gradual military withdrawal would also dramatically improve human rights in the territory, and would be crucial in repairing Indonesian rule. Indeed, the 2005 Helsinki Peace Agreement offers a useful template for conflict resolution as it specified the removal of non-organic military and police forces from Aceh. However, peace in Aceh was forged in the crucible of an unprecedented humanitarian disaster under much international scrutiny. The foreign aid and assistance that flowed into the province gave the military a clear financial incentive to back the process, having undermined previous efforts at a negotiated solution.

Reconciliation is the most challenging aspect of the Road Map since the largely unreformed military is the most powerful state actor in West Papua and it would view any drawdown as an extreme loss of face. Whether as the result of independence or genuine autonomy within Indonesia, a structured military withdrawal is central to improving the lives of ordinary Papuans. Large swathes of the territory remain under de facto military control, which retains an official presence throughout Indonesia through its territorial system that effectively operates a parallel administration alongside the civilian bureaucracy. In West Papua, far from central control in Jakarta, this system feeds abuse, exploitation and environmental catastrophe for the indigenous population, and makes a mockery of the territory's Special Autonomy. Whilst military reform has enjoyed some gains since Suharto's fall, the territorial system still exists as does the military's corrupt business apparatus whereby the Indonesian security forces are deeply involved in resource exploitation across Indonesia. In West Papua's case

this takes the form of direct ownership of logging concessions and other business activities or through lucrative protection services provided to extraction companies such as Freeport and BP. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, himself a former general, has shown little appetite for substantive military reform since ascending to office.

Finally, although the independence movement remains weak and unable to command much international support, recent events in South Sudan might force their hand.

There is now available data to show that although the independence movement remains weak and unable to command much international support, recent events in South Sudan might force their hand (International Crisis Group, 2002; John Saltford, 2000; Akihisa Matsuno, 2011; and Tracey Banivanua-Mar, 2008).

Despite the apparent success of the Aceh peace process, few Indonesian officials seem willing to address the points raised in the proposed Papua Road Map, especially since the independence movement remains weak and unable to command much international support. However, recent events in South Sudan might force their hand. As throughout Africa, the Indonesian state has displayed a remarkable commitment to maintain its inherited colonial borders, however illogical or artificial those boundaries may appear in West Papua's case. Unlike Jakarta's claim to Timor-Leste, which never had a solid basis in international law, its case in West Papua had appeared much stronger. Since Timor-Leste's departure, the borders of Indonesia have exactly mirrored those of the Netherlands East Indies, to which Indonesia sees itself as the legitimate successor. The principle of *uti possidetis juris*, whereby independent successor states replicate the borders of the colonial territories that they replaced, has been well grounded in international relations and diplomacy since decolonisation began after World War II. Therefore, the Indonesian establishment sees little basis for any discussion of West Papua's status. Furthermore, if Jakarta were to countenance independence for West Papua it fears that other provinces might also agitate for separation, potentially heralding the breakup of the Unitary Republic. South Sudan thus sets a worrying precedent since a threat to one colonial boundary can be construed as a threat to colonial boundaries the world over.

West Papua is also much more important to the Indonesian state, and large multinational interests, than Timor-Leste ever was. The Freeport copper and gold mine is Indonesia's largest single revenue earner and a showpiece of the country's vaunted resource wealth. The OPM and other Papuan nationalists have consistently demanded its closure. The Tangguh project is now Indonesia's second largest LNG processing plant, fixing the puncture created by soaring domestic demand and declining output at other major LNG plants. International capital is also increasingly involved in palm oil investments throughout the territory, the status of which would be uncertain in an independent West Papua. In addition to their financial importance, these projects are symbolic of Indonesia's importance to the wider world and loudly demonstrate the efficacy of foreign investment in a country that has seen a precipitous decline in it since the mid-1990s. Moreover, as the International Crisis Group(2002), in 'Indonesia: Resources and Conflict in Papua', *Asia Report 39, September 13*, notes, many active and retired military officers, senior state bureaucrats and other government officials hold lucrative logging concessions or other business interests in the territory, in a pattern reminiscent of Indonesian rule in Timor-Leste. In tandem with the substantial tax and royalties accrued by the state, these interests constitute a powerful motivation for Indonesia to keep West Papua in the fold, by force if necessary.

The OPM has been unable to muster the kind of sustained armed resistance that characterised the conflicts in South Sudan, East Timor and Kosovo, whilst West Papua's independence movement has also lacked a charismatic leader around whom local and international support can coalesce. This is in marked contrast to Timor-Leste, for whose independence struggle Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and Jose Ramos-Horta won the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize. Ramos-Horta is the country's current president, whilst current Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao is another charismatic personality who commanded the Fretilin armed resistance. In West Papua's case the independence movement has long been fractious, riven with ethnic divisions and lacking similar strong leadership. This has particularly been the case with the OPM, which has conducted the most persistent resistance to Indonesian rule. In addition, the OPM has been unable to muster the kind of sustained armed resistance that characterised the conflicts in South Sudan, East Timor and Kosovo. Such a situation is a concern considering that Indonesia's democratic transition has been plagued by violence between competing ethnic groups, often between indigenous groups and migrants from elsewhere in Indonesia. Whilst vertical conflict, that is, between the state and separatists, has been occurring since 1963, West Papua has not yet witnessed large-scale horizontal conflict between migrants and indigenous groups. However, the religious divide between the mostly Muslim migrants and mostly Christian indigenous Papuans has increasingly threatened to spill over into violence since new hardline versions of both religions began arriving and proselytising in West Papua after 1998. Christian Papuans are especially concerned that Jakarta appears to be leaning towards a less tolerant vision of Islamic orthodoxy, a trend that has negatively impacted Christians elsewhere in Indonesia. Whereas many Muslim migrants firmly support of central rule from Jakarta, many indigenous Papuans believe that Special Autonomy is just window dressing and has not been implemented properly.

Therefore, it seems that the chief hope for independence, or even a more meaningful form of self-governance, is international pressure. For an independence or secession movement to succeed it is crucial for it to gain traction within influential foreign states that support the cause on moral or other grounds. South Sudan was able to secure independence largely due to pressure from the African Union, the European Union and the United States. Timor-Leste's annexation by Indonesia in 1975 was never recognised by the United Nations. However, there is no question of ASEAN pressuring Indonesia, whilst the attitude of the major powers towards West Papua remains essentially the same as it was in the 1960s. Despite evidence to the contrary, Indonesia is still seen as too large, too powerful and too important to antagonise. John Saltford(2000), in *UNTEA and UNRWI: United Nations Involvement in West New Guinea During the 1960's, PhD Dissertation*, makes issue that in a communique back to London in 1968, the British Embassy in Washington considered it unimaginable, "the US, Japanese, Dutch or Australian government putting at risk their economic and political relations with Indonesia on a matter of principle involving a relatively small number of primitive peoples". The donor community has since had many opportunities to press Jakarta on West Papua, particularly during the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, but has taken no meaningful action. Moreover, the Indonesian military response to Timor-Leste's independence vote demonstrated that a large multinational military intervention would likely be needed in West Papua too, and the squalid role played by the United States and the United Nations in the Indonesian takeover constitutes another major obstacle to international support.

Nonetheless, causes for optimism do exist. Akihisa Matsuno(2011), in 'West Papua and the changing nature of self-determination', presented at CPACS Conference: *Comprehending*

West Papua, puts the fight for emancipation by West Papua when he argued that the cases of South Sudan, Kosovo and Timor-Leste "suggest that state and morality are seen more related to each other than before, and this explains the fact that what's happening within the borders of a sovereign state is increasingly under international scrutiny". As such, they also indicate that a normative shift in international thinking on rights issues has taken place since Rwanda in 1994, as evidenced by the emergence of the responsibility to protect (RtP) doctrine and a greater willingness to intervene in humanitarian crises. However, the international community has proven unable to apply RtP to economically or politically powerful states, such as Russia and China, highlighting the limits of the doctrine and raising doubts over its implementation against Indonesian misrule in West Papua. Indonesia in 1999 was reeling from the effects of the Asian economic crisis and a difficult transition from authoritarianism, whereas now it appears a much more stable inclusive state that was even elected to chair the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in 2005.

The continuing plight of Papuans in their homeland underlines concerns that the RtP doctrine is only applied sporadically and selectively to the highest profile cases in weak states. For instance, both of Sudan's civil wars combined cost 2.4 million lives and displaced another four million people in one of the worst conflicts since World War II, whilst an estimated 300,000 Timorese died due to Indonesian misrule (1975-1999), from a population of around 850,000. The 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in Dili was filmed and photographed by foreign journalists, reminding the world of the largely forgotten East Timor conflict. Likewise, the Aceh peace deal was forged under unprecedented international scrutiny in the wake of the Indian Ocean tsunami. The independence movement in West Papua has not had any comparable events that have captured the world's attention, despite the fact that Indonesian misrule has resulted in around 100,000 Papuan deaths since 1963. An estimated 30,000 of these died prior to the territory's formal incorporation into Indonesia in 1969, and whilst unlawful killings still occur in West Papua they are on smaller scale since the fall of Suharto in 1998. Nevertheless, Tracey Banivanua-Mar(2008), in "'A thousand miles of cannibal lands': imagining away genocide in the re-colonization of West Papua', *Journal of Genocide Research*, argues, like various other analysts, that the graphic description, depiction, and effects of continuing military operations and Papuan demographic drowning as genocide, and other rights abuses remain common. If charges of Indonesian genocide against Papuans become more accepted then Indonesia will likely face greater outside pressure over West Papua.

Indeed, Akihisa Matsuno(2011), again, has identified another factor that is becoming increasingly relevant to questions of secession in West Papua and elsewhere, namely a failure in governing a disputed territory. This moral dimension behind self-determination, what is termed as a "shift in construction of sovereign responsibility" apparently worked in favour of Timor-Leste. Thus, he argues that, "the world now tends to see the issue of self-determination not in terms of its original legality alone but more in terms of contemporary situations of functioning morality within the state borders". He draws parallels between the present reality in West Papua and Timor-Leste in the late 1980s, in which, "There were serious human rights abuses, the area was closed to foreign media, (an) influx of migrants was marginalising locals and causing simmering resentment, local leaders began to think that the government policies had failed, and there was an emerging young generation of locals who were educated under the Indonesian system as Indonesian children (who) nonetheless refused to identify themselves as Indonesians". On the other hand, however, it should be recognised that Timorese independence was not wholly due to international pressure but more of a

miscalculation by Habibie that his interests would be better served by granting a referendum, which the maverick politician fully expected Indonesia to win.

Despite the problems that an independent West Papua would inevitably face, South Sudan is in a much more precarious situation as most of its villages have no electricity or running water, and few sealed roads exist anywhere in the country. Moreover, West Papua's neighbours PNG, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu have so far remained intact, despite the difficulties in governing ethnically diverse and geographically scattered populations. One of the arguments advanced by Jakarta and its supporters against Timor-Leste's independence was that Indonesia's then 27th province was economically unviable and incapable of governing itself. Whilst independent Timor-Leste has suffered setbacks and remains fragile, the situation has improved markedly since the Indonesian military left. A similar outcome in West Papua, whether the result of independence or within a properly implemented autonomy package, would be a major breakthrough for ordinary Papuans given that Timor-Leste's indigenous population are now doing much better than their Papuan counterparts.

This writer agrees with Akihisa Matsuno(2010) and his thesis on the decolonization of West Papua. If truth be told, West Papua's status outside of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia, as provided by the Round Table Conference at The Hague, points to blanks which exist in the writing of possible histories for Non ó Self Governing Territories including West New Guinea or West Papua. It was the US which was pussy ó footing or had misgivings on the question of self ó determination demanded by Filipinos, yet had an insight into the requirements of the time, and into what was ripe for peace, development and human rights. Eventually, the US had to account for very fundamental reasons. Similarly, Indonesia cannot justify its domination in West New Guinea or West Papua due to the circumstances that do not prevail, there being no reason any more to render any logic in keeping its government authorities and military occupation uninvited on the shores of West Papua, Melanesia, and the Pacific. President Woodrow Wilson was clearly committed to nation ó building projects in the non ó European world, even though there were few parallels in contemporary European colonial policy that aroused great man then. May be it is time to anticipate a new trend in US statecraft, the option for the US to befriend West Papua both due to the emerging status of G77, and in the face of the rise of China as a world soft approach super power, in other words, in order to counter the Chinese challenge and the Chinese Machiavelli in the Pacific.

West Papuan aspirations to self ó determination centres on US cunning of reason supposed in the decolonisation of Philippines in which leadership was impacted by willed and accomplished US Presidents from 1934 till 1946. They set passion to work for itself, and such passion could similarly spare West Papua from the dangerous corollary within the perennial revolt against freedom and reason, and be recognized as a Republic *defactor* or *dejure* under international law. A *laissez ó faire* nature of the Special Autonomy Law, the forerunner to a possible West Papua Independence Act, would have set the momentum to bring about decisive reforms together with the darker aspects: characteristics of failed states usually denoted by high political instability; rampant corruption; dysfunctional economies; collapse of government services; breakdown of law and order; internal conflicts; and loss of state authority and legitimacy. These misgivings were normal and merely transitional features of the transfer of government responsibility to the Papuans. A proclamation of independence was issued on 1 July 1971 at Waris by Papuan nationalists led by the Commander of the Free Papua Movement or TPN/OPM. It points towards a *defactor* or *dejure* Papuan state which was formed where the colonial cartography's more arbitrary yet effective of boundaries cuts

across the island of New Guinea at 141st meridian east. The Papua Conflict, therefore, is nothing but mutual violence and a state of war between one nation and another.

A feasible tenet of the state of war approach to deliver would be for the two ó term Democrat US President, Barrack Obama to factor in and embrace critical sociology and a long ó overdue perspective on the salience of conflict. The US President could call on the Indonesians to begin negotiations, adopt the assumption that conflict would in the end destroy existing social arrangements, be correctly willed and accomplished, and as a matter of practical necessity set his passion for the democratic proposition to work for itself. It is democratic to lead without praise, taken for granted by the world today. Here, President Barrack Obama could prove his moral worth, and find satisfaction in the culture of humanity and the UN's inclination to peace, development, human rights. President Woodrow Wilson accomplished a formidable assignment in his time under the same banner of democratic proposition that defines the greatest nation on earth.

When all things come undone, Indonesia's illegal annexation of West Papua and the demise of its claim to New Guinea will be furnished by intellectual corruption of a whole generation of Papuans who have become tools of interests; of state interests, from above, and personal interests from below. It is a story about Papuans who were casualties of war fought by global powers who designed it in the absence of passion for the Melanesian Machiavelli, and therefore the call which arouses great men from Melanesia in the present historical epoch who will express the will of the time to be feared rather than loved, with bold dialectical twist. In any case, a trail of flopped decolonization of the Papuan race over 60 long years is comprehensible and consequently the incarceration and capitulation of Indonesia over the mutual violence and state of war in West Papua demands a verdict today, if never before. Perhaps, West Papua's time to be free has come, all pistons firing.